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INDUS WATERS TREATY: AN IMPEDIMENT TO THE INDIAN HYDROHEGEMONY

*

DR. WASEEM AHMAD QURESHI

Water is the most exquisite commodity, and its utility in the sectors of economy,

food, and power production is exceptional. To capture this resource more
effectively, powerful nations are racing to raise water management infrastructure
in order to seize the reins of regionalpolitical supremacy by establishinghydrohegemony. Within this context, India is eager to take control of all Pakistani water
supplies by developing projects over the western rivers of the Indus Basin.
Frequently, Pakistan objects to these projects, fearing that its water supplies are
gradually diminishing. As a result, water conflicts between India and Pakistanare
escalating, and the global community fears that these conflicts will escalate into
full-scale water wars, in a situation where both nations are nuclearpowers. Here
Pakistanclaims that India is robbing Pakistaniwaters and trying to get hold of all
water resources in the region of occupied Kashmir. However, India maintains that
climate change, not its projects, is to blame for the decreased waterflows in the
western rivers. Interestingly, the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT), a bilaterally agreed
treaty between India and Pakistan,prohibitsIndiafrom diverting any watersfrom
rivers allocated to Pakistan. So, arguably, the existing legalframework of the IWT
poses an impediment to the Indian desire for hydro-hegemony over Pakistan's
legal water rights. Consequently, Indian authorities are rethinking the IWT, and
are going so far as to imagine the unilateralabandonment of the IWT. This Article
seeks to explore the realIndian rationalefor modifying or nullifying the IWT.

INTRODUCTION

Sharing water resources is a complex and difficult mechanism.' The
transboundary sharing of international river waters involves aspects of sovereignty,
principles of law, and politics, supplemented with the aspects of geographical
characteristics and entrenched political hegemony. It also includes important facets
of water2 as a fluid resource, involving its management and controls in respect of
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2. TRANSBOUNDARY WATER MANAGEMENT 30-32 (Anton Earle et al. eds., 2010) [hereinafter
Earle] (discussing various aspects of water sharing of international basins, including sovereignty and
water as a fluid resource).
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storage and navigation, with additional regard to innumerable dynamics of
domestic, agrarian, and other similar basic uses of water.' Different reports have
noted that there are more than one hundred international river water basins that are
shared by more than two sovereign countries, 4 including, notably, the Nile,
Mekong, Niger, Congo-Chambeshi, Amazon, Brahmaputra, and Indus Rivers.'
Water is undoubtedly a building block of life and an elementary human
resource, because of its numerous fundamental uses.6 These include water as a key
element in food production, power production, economic development, and several
other similar basic processes of human life.' Despite vast water resources, sporadic
water apportionments among nations have supplemented water scarcity in various
regions. A race by states to capture water resources has already begun, and
influential nations like China and India are trying to control and manage the water
flows of their regions in the hope of establishing hydro-hegemony.9 Consequently,
international conflicts over water apportionment are surfacing and many experts
and scholars contend they are already evolving into water wars this century.' 0
Water conflicts are notably escalating in the regions of Latin America, Central
Asia, and the Middle East," and these areas are liable to encounter increased water
conflicts or even water wars in the near future.' 2 This is anticipated mainly because
of growing water scarcity and emerging international tensions over water
apportionments.1 3
Water conflicts date as far back as thousands of years ago. " In the twentieth
century, the world saw numerous water conflicts, but never full-scale wars waged
solely over water management or water control. " However, experts now believe
3.
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APPROACH TO MANAGING COMPLEX WATER NETWORKS 131 (2012).

4. Anthony Turton, The Southern African Hydropolitical Complex, in MANAGEMENT OF
TRANSBOUNDARY RIVERS & LAKES 64 (Olli Varis et al. eds., 2008).
5. Kazuaki Hori & Yoshiki Saito, Classification, Architecture, and Evolution of Large-River
Deltas, in LARGE RIVERS: GEOMORPHOLOGY AND MANAGEMENT 76-77 (Avijit Gupta ed., 2008).
6. Shaden Abdel-Gawad, Actualizing the Right to Water: An Egyptian Perspectivefor an Action
Plan, in WATER AS A HUMAN RIGHT FOR THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA 137 (Asit K. Biswas
et al. eds., 2008).
7. KERRY TURNER ET AL., ECONOMIC VALUATION OF WATER RESOURCES IN AGRICULTURE 91
(2004). See also Joachim von Braun & Alisher Mirzabaev, Nexus Scientific Research, in THE WATER,
FOOD, ENERGY AND CLIMATE NEXUS 60 (Jamie Bartram & Felix Dodds, eds., 2016).
8. Saif Al Qaydi, Biophysical Resources and the Built Environment: Features, Foci, and Issues
in the Muslim Majority Countries, in THE MUSLIM WORLD IN THE 21ST CENTURY: SPACE, POWER AND
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 95 (Samiul Hasan ed., 2012).
9. GUSTAF OLSSON, WATER AND ENERGY: THREATS AND OPPORTUNITIES 192 (2nd ed.2015).
10. Jeremy Allouche et al., Water Securities and the Individual: Challengesfrom Human Security
to Consumerism, in HANDBOOK ON WATER SECURITY 61 (Claudia Pahl-Wostl et al. eds., 2016)
(discussing competition to capture water resources and the possibility of water wars).
I1. Peter H. Gleik, Water Conflict Chronology, in THE WORLD'S WATER 2008-2009 151 (2009)

[hereinafter World's Water 2008-2009].
12.

JULIAN CRIBB, THE COMING FAMINE 21 (2010) [hereinafter Cribb].

13. Id. at 12.
14. World's Water 2008-2009, supra note 11, at 151.
15. Cribb, supra note 12, at 21.
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that full-scale wars will be waged over water apportionment during this century.
The surges in population growth, global warming, urbanization, inefficient water
management, inequitable employment of water apportionment, and hydropolitics
are noted as likely to escalate minor water conflicts into water wars.'1 Furthermore,
scholars argue that the absence of water wars so far has been mainly a result of
cooperation among states which share water of the same river basin, i.e. coriparian states." Conversely, an imbalance of powers among co-riparian states is
the main reason that co-riparians do not go to war over water access." It is largely
hydropolitics, where powerful nations muscle their way to advantageous positions.
Notwithstanding discussions over the possibility of water wars, frequent major
water conflicts over water apportionment are inevitable in the near future.'1
In hydropolitics, controlling water supplies translates into controlling the
regions dependent on those water supplies.2 0 In international river basins, coriparian states race to control the management of water supplies to gain the upper
hand in regional politics.21 Managing water supplies delivers political power to
aggressive states because water is essential for healthy economic growth. 22
Hydropolitics scholar Edward Barbier has noted that water and economics go hand
in hand, suggesting that neither water nor the economy is independent of one
another, but are rather interdependent elements of a greater system. 23
Within the same context, it is apparent in the semiarid and arid regions of
Asia and Africa that lower riparian states are concerned with the actions of the
upper riparian states regarding water management, water control, and water
pollution, as water flows from upper riparian to lower riparian. 24 Upper riparian
states tend to reduce water supplies, construct water management infrastructure,
and pollute waters against the interests of lower riparian states. 2 5 Notwithstanding
water politics and its hydroeconomic and political aspects, the developed world has
rarely seen any major international water political conflicts, as compared to
developing countries. This is because many developing countries rely more on
water sources flowing from upper riparians, and their water supplies are estimated
16.

Sarah Hendry & Geoffrey Gooch, Ecosystem Services and Water Security, in ROUTLEDGE

HANDBOOK OF ECOSYSTEM SERVICES 501 (2016).

17. Sina Marx & Anik Bhaduri, Understandingthe Global Water System for Water Cooperation,
in FREE FLOW 290 (2013).
18. NAYAN SHARMA, RIVER SYSTEM ANALYSIS AND MANAGEMENT 356 (2016).
19. ARIEL DINAR ET AL., BRIDGES OVER WATER: UNDERSTANDING TRANSBOUNDARY WATER
CONFLICT, NEGOTIATION AND COOPERATION 13 (2013).
20. Earle, supra note 2, at 28; see generally KAI WEGERICH & JEROEN WARNER, THE POLITICS

OF WATER: A SURVEY (2010).
21. MOSTAFA DOLATYAR & TIM S. GRAY, WATER POLITICS IN THE MIDDLE EAST: A CONTEXT
FOR CONFLICT OR CO-OPERATION? x (2000).

22. The U.N. World Water Development Report 3: Water in a Changing World, WORLD WATER
ASSESSMENT PROGRAMME xix (2009).

23. Edward B. Barbier, Water and Growth in Developing Countries, in HANDBOOK OF WATER
ECONOMICS 501 (Ariel Dinar & Kurt Schwabe eds., 2015).
24. ARUN P. ELHANCE, HYDROPOLITICS IN THE THIRD WORLD: CONFLICT AND COOPERATION IN
INTERNATIONAL RIVER BASINS x (1999).

25. Id. at x-xi.
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to be withdrawn by fifty percent by 2025, thus the probability of conflict escalation
is more acute in developing world.26
In recent times, water conflicts between India and Pakistan have escalated,
both quantitatively and qualitatively, as India is gearing up to build water
management infrastructures over its western rivers. The Indus Waters Treaty
(IWT), a bilateral agreement between the two nations, specifically allocated these
western rivers for Pakistan's unrestricted use. It is thus feared that a water war
between these nations is an imminent possibility,27 particularly given the number
of prior conflicts between these two states. 28 In this context, this Article explores
the different aspects of water conflicts between India and Pakistan and considers
various routes of dispute resolution. This Article also investigates the notion that
India, as an upper riparian state, is trying to take control of Pakistan's water
supplies in order to establish hydro-hegemony and enjoy political supremacy.
Thus, an assessment of the IWT within this context is the central focus in this
Article, including an analysis of India and Pakistan's perspectives on the
agreement. In addition, this Article explores the relationship between India's
efforts to modify or discontinue the existing legal framework under the IWT, the
rationale behind India's efforts in doing so, and India's endeavor to establish
hydro-hegemony.
Section I of this Article defines hydro-hegemony in order to contextualize the
political maneuvering that nations might exercise in water apportionment and
water utilization. This section will analyze key aspects of hydro-hegemony and
consider important questions, including whether practices of water apportionment
tend to develop cooperation or conflict between co-riparian states.
Section II will evaluate regional tensions as subversions to support hydrohegemony by detailing India and Pakistan's prior water conflicts. This section has
two parts. Section 1(A) will briefly touch upon India's infrastructure construction
plans in light of the IWT, and will raise important questions, such as whether
India's construction works violate IWT. Section II(B) will then explore the nexus
between construction works and hydro-hegemony.
Section III of this Article will explore India's growing interest in modifying
or nullifying the IWT, or establishing a new and wholly independent IWT. Section
III(A) will explore whether India's sentiment is tilting toward reviewing the
existing IWT legal framework. Section III(B) will explain India's rationale or
reasoning for modifying or nullifying the existing framework of the IWT. Section
III(C) will assess the proposed IWT II. This subsection introduces the growing
concept of IWT II among Indian scholars and provides an overview of five
different schools of thought within India that demand IWT II or the modification

26. MANAS CHATTERJI & B.M. JAIN, CONFLICT AND PEACE IN SOUTH ASIA 270 (2008).
27. INDIA'S NATIONAL SECURITY: ANNUAL REVIEw 2012 265 (Satish Kumar ed., 2013)
[hereinafter Kumar].
28. GREG CASHMAN & LEONARD C. ROBINSON, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CAUSES OF WAR:
PATTERNS OF INTERSTATE CONFLICT FROM WORLD WAR I TO IRAQ 205 (2007) (noting that major wars
between Pakistan and India were fought in 1947-8, 1965, 1971, and since 1998).
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or nullification of the existing IWT.
Finally, Section IV of this Article will examine Pakistan's sentiments against
modification or nullification of the IWT. Here, the possibility of resolving water
conflicts between India and Pakistan through the existing legal framework of the
IWT will be set out. Additionally, this section will briefly touch upon the aspect of
trust deficit between the nations due to the noncompliance of the Indian state.
Finally, the scope of Article 7 of the IWT will be examined in order to determine
whether it accommodates modem emerging concerns of both states.
I.

HYDRO-HEGEMONY

Hydro-hegemony is essentially the politicization and domination of
29
waterways by powerful states seeking to control regional politics. Hegemony
exists where one powerful state imposes its leadership forcefully upon weaker
states.30 When hegemony is applied to waterways, the result is weaker co-riparian
31
states experiencing heavy reliance on inflows from powerful states. The resulting
variability of power among nations sharing the same international river
32
-is key to understanding water
basin--known as the "asymmetry" of powers
conflicts. Professor Mark Zeitoun and Professor Jeroen Warner, who are leading
academicians on hydropolitics, provided a more detailed definition of hydrohegemony:
[H]egemony at the river-basin level, achieved through water resource
control strategies such as resource capture, integration and
containment." These strategies are executed through an array of tactics
including coercion, pressure, treaties, knowledge construction, and
others that are enabled by the exploitation of existing power
34
asymmetries, usually within a weak institutional context.

Hojjat Mianabadi, who is a leading scholar on hydropolitics, identified
prominent hydro-hegemonies in the world, including Turkey's hydro-hegemony in
3
the international river basins of the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers. 1 Similarly, Israel
has hydro-hegemony over the Jordan River basins, Egypt over the Nile River
36
basins, and Uzbekistan over the Aral Sea basins. Mianabadi adds that, although
Egypt is a lower riparian state with access to only five percent of Nile River

29. Wegerich & Warner, supra note 20, at 254.
30. POWER IN THE 21sT CENTURY: INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL
ECONOMY IN A CHANGING WORLD 33 (Enrico Fels et al. eds., 2012).
31. Jonathan Lautze & Herath Manthrithilake, Water Security, in KEY CONCEPTS IN WATER
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT (2014).
32. Hojjat Mianabadi et al., Trans-boundaryRiver Basin Management, in CONFLICT RESOLUTION
IN WATER RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT 139 (Keith W. Hipel et al. eds., 2015)

[hereinafter Hipel et al.].
33. Id. at 140.
34. Patrick MacQuarrie & Aaron T. Wolf, Understanding Water Security, in ENVIRONMENTAL

SECURITY 182 (Rita Floyd & Richard A. Matthew eds., 2013).
35. Hipel et al., supra note 32, at 140.
36. Id.
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waters, it asserts its hydro-hegemony to exploit up to ninety-seven percent of all
water from the Nile River.3 7 Similarly, in the Indus River basins, the water
conflicts present an unusual dual hegemony. There, China enjoys hydro-hegemony
over India while India holds hydro-hegemony against Pakistan,3 Bangladesh, and
Nepal.3 9
Within international river basins, one can locate hydro-hegemony by
evaluating the asymmetrical power structure in the utilization of water.4 0 For
instance, one can determine authoritative water exploitation through hydrohegemony by examining three central and contingent determinants. The first
feature, "exploitation potential," is the capacity of a powerful state to construct
water management infrastructure in order to control the water flow. The second
characteristic of hydro-hegemony is termed "riparian position," referring to the
geographical location of a state in terms of water flow. Particularly, this describes
whether the concerned state is a lower or upper riparian state. The third feature is
the "three dimensions of powers," referring to the structural, bargaining, and
ideological aspects of a state. 4 1
Here, the structural aspect is the "might" in terms of power, which includes
military strength, economic potency, political support, bargaining power, and other
state power determinants. 42 Relatedly, the bargaining aspect refers to the ability of
a powerful regime to manipulate other, weaker states into compliance with its
agendas; this is basically the weaker states endorsing and enforcing the more
powerful state's interests in a convincing way. 43 The ideological characteristic is
the principal aspect of power-play by the hegemonic state. This feature allows the
powerful state to prevent other states from resolving their grievances by altering
people's perceptions into accepting the authoritative role of the powerful state."
Through these tactical mechanisms, hegemonic states employ consensus in
regional politics, which sometimes includes forceful imposition through military
force and sanctions, and thus attaining control of the resources of weaker states. 45
As a report on the "Indus Waters Treaty and Resolution of Water Conflicts
Between Two Nuclear Nations (Pakistan and India)" notes, India has managed to

37. Id.
38. IMAGINING INDUSTAN: OVERCOMING WATER INSECURITY IN THE INDUS BASIN 198 (Zafar
Adeel & Robert Wirsing eds., 2017) [hereinafter Adeel & Wirsing]; see generally Mely CaballeroAnthony & Pau Khan Khup Hangzo, Water, in NON-TRADITIONAL SECURITY IN ASIA 72 (2013).
39. NAHO MIRUMACHI, TRANSBOUNDARY WATER POLITICS IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD 79

(2015) [hereinafter Mirumachi].
40. Id. at 9.
41.

Stephanie Hawkins, The Eighth InternationalWorkshop on Hydro-Hegemony: Law & Hydro-

Hegemony (Nov.

9, 2015),

http://stephanie-hawkins.com/category/hydro-hegemony/

[hereinafter

Hawkins].
42. Earle, supranote 2, at 39.
43 Hawkins, supra note 41.
44. TATAH MENTAN, DILEMMAS OF WEAK STATES: AFRICA AND TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM IN
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 5 (2004).
45. Mark Zeitoun & Jeroen Warner, Hydro-Hegemony - A Framework for Analysis of TransBoundary Water Conflicts, 8 WATER POL'Y 435 (2006).
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gain hydro-hegemony in the Indus water basins against Pakistan through its
diplomatic relations; its positive image in the global community; its geographical
location as an upper riparian state; and its economic, political, and ideological
strengths.46 This supposition is further supported by the analyses of Rizwan Ullah
Kokab and Adnan Nawaz, academicians in Pakistan, who have observed that India
has exploited the water supplies of several states in the region by employing
hydro-hegemony, including against Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Nepal, by taking
advantage of being an upper riparian state.4 7
It is important to note that powerful nations with military, economic, and
political might, who are usually upper riparian states, tend to enjoy hydrohegemony in the region while utilizing international river waters.4 8 Hydrohegemony in turn gives rise to regional water conflicts.4 9 Customarily, in order to
safeguard their interests and to avoid violent means to resolve water conflicts,
states rely on establishing water sharing agreements through cooperation. 50
However, achieving consensus in establishing a treaty or an agreement for the
purpose of sharing water equitably is a complex mechanism, the journey to which
is long and difficult.'
On the other hand, only through cooperation can states be mutually
benefitted. This cooperation helps achieve a better water management system,
improved ecological protection, strengthened peace in the region, and,
consequently, decreased regional frictions and conflicts.5 2 Some prominent
examples of cooperation among states to diminish conflicts and resolve water
conflicts equitably by mutual agreement include the Great Lakes Water Quality
Agreement, 1978, between the US and Canada; the Agreement for the Cooperation
for the Sustainable Development of the Mekong River Basin, 1995, among
Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam; the Niles Waters Agreement, 1959,
between Egypt and Sudan; and the IWT, 1960, between India and Pakistan.5 3
Despite the presence of a water sharing treaty, India and Pakistan are facing
emerging water conflicts. Significantly, Pakistan's growing concern about India's

46.

INDUS WATERS TREATY AND RESOLUTION OF WATER CONFLICTS BETWEEN TWO NUCLEAR

NATIONS (PAK. & INDIA), http://www.feem-web.itless/essl2/files/papers/hayat

(last visited May 20,

2017) [hereinafter IWT Resolution].
47.

Rizwan Ullah Kokab & Adnan Nawaz, Indus Waters Treaty: Need ForReview, 2(2) ASIAN J.

OF SOC. SCI. & HUMAN., 213-14 (2013) [hereinafter Kokab & Nawaz].
48. Zeitoun & Warner, supranote 45, at 437; see also IWT Resolution, supra note 46; Hawkins,
supra note 41.
49. Hipel et al., supra note 32, at 139.
50.

ROBERT G. WIRSING ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT OVER WATER RESOURCES IN

HIMALAYAN ASIA 12 (2012).
51. See, e.g., Marie J. Gunning, The Projected Impact of the North American Free Trade
Agreement on Transboundary Water Management between Mexico and the U.S.A.,
in
TRANSBOUNDARY

WATER

RESOURCES

MANAGEMENT:

INSTITUTIONAL
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APPROACHES 77 (Jacques Ganoulis et al. eds., 1996).
52. See generally SHARON B. MEGDAL ET AL., SHARED BORDERS SHARED WATERS: ISRAELIPALESTINIAN AND COLORADO RIVER BASIN WATER CHALLENGES (2012).

53. See IWT Resolution, supra note 46.
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construction of dams on the western rivers flowing to Pakistan poises India to be
able to manage all of Pakistan's water supplies and enjoy political supremacy. 54
However, water conflicts between India and Pakistan are not a novel phenomenon,
since they have deep roots.
II.

THE

IWT AND

WATER CONFLICTS BETWEEN INDIA AND PAKISTAN

'

Water apportionment conflicts in the Indus water basins can be traced back to
the regime of the colonial Raj in British India among states within Hindustan (the
name given to India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh as a single country before partition)
during the early periods of the twentieth century." However, the Anderson and
Rao commissions resolved water disputes among Hindustani states in 1935 and
1942, respectively. 56 After partition in 1947, Hindustan was bifurcated into the two
states of Pakistan and India. The water sources and Indus river basin water
apportionment were complicated further because the headworks of Pakistan's
water supplies then laid within the territories of Indian-occupied Kashmir."? As a
result, water conflicts between these newly created states were inevitable. After
only a year, in 1948, India claimed territorial sovereignty of water apportionment
and blocked all water supplies to Pakistan.5 ' Owing to this unreasonable water
blockage by India, war was foreseeable. In 1960, the World Bank provided neutral
mediation to bring the hostile neighboring states to an agreement. The fruit of this
mediation is today known as the Indus Waters Treaty. 9
The IWT designates the three main western tributaries to Pakistan's exclusive
and unrestricted use and positions the three main eastern tributaries for India's
exclusive and unrestricted use.' Furthermore, the treaty prohibits India and
Pakistan from navigating or storing waters from the other's exclusive tributaries,
i.e., India is not allowed to store or navigate waters away from the due course of
the western tributaries and Pakistan is not allowed to store or navigate waters away
from the eastern tributaries. 6
As discussed above, India is developing infrastructure to thwart Pakistan's
exclusive access to the wester river waters, and thus Pakistan's entire water supply,
and to claim political supremacy in the form of hydro-hegemony. 62
54. Kumar, supra note 27, at 265.
55. See IWT Resolution, supra note 46.
56. Chandrakant D. Thatte, Indus Waters and the 1960 Treaty Between India and Pakistan, in
MANAGEMENT OF TRANSBOUNDARY RIVERS AND LAKES 178 (Olli Varis et al. eds., 2008).
57. TAl TAN YONG & GYANESH KUDAISYA, THE AFTERMATH OF PARTITION IN SOUTH ASIA 95

(2000).
58. Scott Barrett, Conflict and Cooperation in Managing International Water Resources 11
(World Bank Pol'y Res. Dep't, Pol'y Res. Working Paper No. 1303 (May 1994)),
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/530861468740155901/pdf/multi-page.pdf.
59. See IWT Resolution, supra note 46.
60. Indus Waters Treaty 1960 art. 2-3, India-Pak., Sept. 19, 1960, 419 U.N.T.S. 125.
61. Id.
62. See Caballero-Anthony & Hangzo, supra note 38, at 72; see also MALAYALA MANORAMA,
MANORAMA YEARBOOK 2004 573 (2004) (demonstrating how India is trying to capture Pakistani water
supplies); see also SHARAD K. JAIN ET AL., HYDROLOGY AND WATER RESOURCES OF INDIA 940 (2007)
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A. Indian Construction Works andIWT Violations
The IWT explicitly maintains that India can only pursue construction works
as run-off hydropower production projects." It adds that dams for storage purposes
or even for agrarian purposes cannot be built if they change the water supply
capacity of rivers or divert them from their due natural course.'
Regardless of the bilateral treaty, India is racing to develop water
management construction works over the western rivers." Pakistani authorities are
currently challenging a number of these construction works, including the Uri
Nimo Bazgo project, the Salal project, the Baglihar power project, the Ratle
66
project, the Wullar Barrage, and the Krishinganga project, among others.
Expressing Pakistan's concerns, experts noted that the Baglihar project could
decrease Pakistan's water supplies and it could enable India to create floods at
political whim.6 1 Similarly, the Kishanganga project reduces Pakistan's power
production capacity and adversely affects the environment. Furthermore, the
Kishanganga dam's height is in violation of the allowable dam height under the
IWT. 68
The Wullar Barrage (the preferred Pakistani term for India's Tulbul
Navigation project) is the most contested of India's construction works. Pakistan
contended that the Wullar Barrage has the potential to dry three of its major
69
tributaries: the Upper Jhelum, Upper Chenab, and Lower Bari Doab Rivers.
Additionally, the completion of the Wullar Barrage resulted in a reduction of the
power production capacity of the Mangla plant in Pakistan.70 From a legal
standpoint, the Wullar Barrage allegedly violates Article 1(11), Article 3(4), and
Article 8(h) of the IWT. Article 1(11) prohibits both states from changing the
water flows of the rivers. Article 3(4) proscribes India from constructing projects
to store waters of the western rivers. Article 8(h) mandates that India can only
construct incidental water storage facilities, and even then, only after it acquires
Pakistan's permission to construct such a project." The Indus Water Commission,
a regulatory oversight committee established under the IWT, was unable to resolve

(explaining Indian water management capacity and its race to develop more infrastructure).
63. Indus Waters Treaty, supra note 60, at Annex D-E (listing the allowed dead storage
capacity).
64. Indus Waters Treaty, supra note 60, art. 3; see also MUNIR OZTURK ET AL., PLANTS,
POLLUTANTS AND REMEDIATION 116 (2016).

65.

Malayala Manorama, supra note 62, at 573.

66.

Raja Nazakat Ali et al., Indus Waters Treaty between Pakistanand India: From Conciliation

to Confrontation, 10(2) DIALOGUE 166, 174 (2015).
67. Pia Malhotra, Tulbul Navigation Project/WullarBarrage, 4(9) EPFLOGUE 34 (2010).
68.

F. Naz, Water: A Cause of Power Politics in South Asia, in WATER AND SOCIETY 11 104-05

(C.A. Brebbia ed., 2013).
69.

MOONis AllMAR, THE CHALLENGES OF CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES IN SOUTH ASIA

397-98 (2001).
70. Adeel & Wirsing, supra note 38, at 39-42.
71. Malhotra, supra note 67, at 35; see also RONGXING GUo, TERRITORIAL DISPUTES AND
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 143 (2006); see also Indus Waters Treaty, supra note 60, arts. 1(11), 3(4),

8(h).
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Pakistan's allegations of India violating the TWT. As a result, Pakistan wanted to
pursue its claims through arbitration, but subsequently, in 1987, India halted
construction of the Wullar Barrage. However, India has been pressing to resume its
construction works. 72 Recently allegations suggest that India has reconvened its
construction work of the Wullar Barrage in hopes of completing it.7 1
Similarly, in relatively recent times, India's Kishanganga project (KHEP) was
a leading concern for Pakistan because it had the potential to harm Pakistan's
interests and violate the IWT. This project could reduce the power production
capacity of Pakistan's Neelum Jhelum power production project by navigating
river waters away from its course. Experts noted that this project would reduce the
water supplies to the Neelum River by sixty-one percent, 74 which would violate the
IWT. More specifically, under Article 3(2) and Article 2, India is prohibited from
navigating the western river water flows away from their natural course.
Furthermore, India must not exceed the storage capacity prescribed by the IWT.7 1
In response to Pakistan's concerns, the CoA ordered India in 2011 to halt its
construction works at the Kishanganga project and prohibited India from
constructing any permanent structure on the western river waters. 76
Conversely, in its final judgment regarding KHEP in 2013, the CoA held that
India could continue its construction works.77 However, while deciding the issues
raised by Pakistan concerning the minimum flows, the court found that, in
accordance with statutory and customary international law, India's construction
work and the KHEP must not harm Pakistan's agricultural system or power
production capacity.7 8 Similarly, the court maintained that the KHEP project must
also accommodate environmental protection laws found in international law.79
The Baglihar Dam is another case of water conflict between Pakistan and
India. In accordance with the IWT, a neutral expert resolved the issue by
delivering a balanced decision. The decision came out in the year 2007 and sided
with Pakistan on mainly design issues, with meticulous details of power capacity
and water diversion.8 0
Pakistan has reservations about several of India's construction works over the
western waters, which were allotted for the unrestricted use of Pakistan under the

72. See Adeel & Wirsing, supra note 38, at 41.
73. India Rejects Pakistan Objections, Work on Tulbul Navigation Project in Full Swing,
NORTHLINES (Oct. 7, 2016), http://www.thenorthlines.com/india-rejects-pak-objections-work-tulbul-

navigation-project-full-swing/.
74. Naz, supra note 68, at 105.
75. Adeel & Wirsing, supra note 38, at 79; see also Manish Vaid & Tridivesh Singh Maini, IndoPak Water Disputes: Time for Fresh Approaches, 4(2) PEACE PRINTS: S. ASIAN J. OF PEACEBUILDING

(2012), http://wiscomp.org/pubn/wiscomp-peace-prints/4-2/Indo-Pak Water Disputes.pdf.
76.

See Vaid & Maini, supra note 75.

77. Adeel & Wirsing, supra note 38, at 79-80.
78. Id.
79. Id.
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IWT.8 ' Meanwhile, India is pursuing the construction of forty-five to sixty dams
over these exact waters.8 2 This alleged construction is of significance because
Kashmir possesses the headworks of all of Pakistan's freshwater supplies.83 8 4
Primarily, Pakistan is focusing on disputing the construction works of the
Kishanganga, Ratle, Pakul Dal, Miyar, and local Kalnai projects."
B. India's Race to Develop Hydro-Hegemony
As noted above, India is racing to build dams on the western rivers to capture
the water supplies of Pakistan, in order to be better able to manage and navigate
water sources and the headworks of Pakistan's water supplies. It is estimated that
India possesses more than 4,000 dams in total, of which seventy-three percent are
86
deliberately built on the western rivers allocated for Pakistan's unrestricted use.
the
Additionally, India is pursuing the construction of hundreds of more dams on
western rivers." India is also trying to exploit the western river waters by resuming
construction of Tulbul Navigation project, also known as Wullar Barrage, which
was officially halted due to objections from Pakistan in 2007."
India is taking advantage of its geographical location as an upper riparian
state to Pakistan in order to take full managerial control of Pakistan's water
supplies. 9 Recognizing this, Pakistan has long contested several of India's
construction works, which with time has become controversial between these
hostile neighbors. Pakistan has only raised issues against projects that have a
bigger impact on the water flows of the western rivers, allotted to Pakistan in the
IWT.90 The dispute resolution framework of the IWT is somewhat slow and takes
91
time to process conflicts, which defeats its purpose. This is because by the time
the issue gets to the highest available forum, India's construction works are
typically complete or have incurred so much cost that such forums are unable to
deliver justice to Pakistan. 92
Over time, India has managed to store the river waters of the western
81. ASHOK SWAIN, STRUGGLE AGAINST THE STATE: SOCIAL NETWORK AND PROTEST
MOBILIZATION IN INDIA 33 (2010).
82. INDIA'S
FOREIGN
RELATIONS
2008 1368
(Avtar
S.
Bhasin
ed.,
2008),
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edulviewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.692.3283&rep=repl&typepdf.
83. MOHAN BHANDARI, SOLVING KASHMIR 180 (2006).
84. INDIA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 2008, supra note 82.
85. SWAIN, supranote 81, at 33.
86. Malayama Manorama, supra note 62, at 573.
87. Jain et al., supra note 62, at 940.
88. PM Modi Reviews Indus Waters Treaty, Says 'Blood & Water Can't Flow Together', TIMES
OF INDIA (Sept. 26, 2016), http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/PM-Modi-reviews-Indus-WaterTreaty-says-blood-and-water-cant-flow-together/articleshow/54526722.cms.
89. Abdul Rauf Lqbal, Hydro-Politics in India and its Impact on Pakistan, 6(1) ISSRA PAPERS
101 (2014).
90. Indus Waters Treaty, supra note 60, art. 3; see also ZESHAN ALL ET AL., PLANTS,
POLLUTANTS AND REMEDIATION 116 (Munir Ozturk et al. eds, 2015).
91. Muhammad Adeel, Indus Waters Treaty and the Case for Hydro-Hegemony, CENTER FOR
STRATEGIC & CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 4 (2016), http://cscr.pk/pdf/rb/IndusTreaty.pdf.
92. See id. at 5; see also Jain et al., supra note 62, at 940.
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tributaries and manage their controls by constructing numerous massive water
storage and water managing infrastructure projects. Through this, India can cause
droughts and floods in Pakistan at whim.93 It is calculated that India can decide to
stop all water supplies to Pakistan in conflict for up to twenty-six consecutive
days.9 4 Therefore, India's capacity to hold Pakistan's water supplies is tantamount
to a political maneuver to ensure India's political supremacy in times of war or
conflict. 95

More recently, aggressive assertions by Indian officials have fueled the water
conflicts between Pakistan and India. On September 26, 2016, India postponed its
meeting with the Indus Water Commission and proclaimed that it is considering
withdrawing from the IWT entirely.9 6 On that occasion Indian Prime Minister
Narendra Modi also gave a statement that India would exploit all waters from the
western rivers and resume construction projects over the western rivers to
maximize power production, storage facilitation, and agrarian uses of these
waters.97 In response, Pakistani authorities claimed that Indian revocation of the
IWT would inevitably lead to war.9' These plans would understandably take
decades to achieve, but India seems determined that hydro-domination over
Pakistan is a nonviolent way to ensure political supremacy in the region. 99
Pakistan is already facing water scarcity, and experts and reports assert that
water access in Pakistan will continue to deteriorate at an alarming rate.'I The
New York Times warned that Pakistan could face serious water shortages in the
near future: "energy-starved Pakistanis, their economy battered by chronic fuel and
electricity shortages, may soon have to contend with a new resource cnsis: major
water shortages."' Similarly, Pakistan's minister for water and power in 2015,
Khawaja Asif, also noted the water shortage in Pakistan, stating: "A combination
of global climate change, waste and mismanagement have led to an alarmingly
rapid depletion of Pakistan's water supply . .. under the present situation."'02 The
Asian Development Bank categorized Pakistan as a water scarce country,
observing:
Pakistan is one of the most water-stressed countries in the world, not far
from being classified as 'water scarce,' with less than 1,000 cubic
93. ANDREw GUZMAN, OVERHEATED: THE HUMAN COST OF CLIMATE CHANGE 159 (2013).
94. Khalid Chandio, India Re-Thinking Indus Waters Treaty, IPRI REVIEW (Aug. 27, 2014),
http://www.ipripak.org/india-re-thinking-indus-water-treaty/.
95. lqbal, supra note 89, at 104-05.
96. Polina Tikhonova, India vs. Pakistan Water Conflict Poses Global Threat, VALUEWALK
(Nov. 4, 2016, 10:42 AM), https://www.valuewalk.com/2016/1 1/india-vs-pakistan-water-conflict/.
97. Justin Rowlatt, Why India's Water Dispute With Pakistan Matters, BBC (Sept. 28, 2016),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-37483359.
98. Tikhonova, supranote 96.
99. Rowlatt, supra note 97.
100. Salman Masood, Starved for Energy, Pakistan Bracesfor a Water Crisis, N.Y. TIMES (Feb.
12,
2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/13/world/asia/pakistan-braces-for-major-watershortages.htmi [hereinafter Masood].
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meters per person per year. . . . At present, Pakistan's storage capacity is
limited to a 30-day supply, well below the recommended 1,000 days for
103
countries with a similar climate.

Although diplomatic negotiations between the two nations regarding water
conflicts had been on hold for two years, this deadlock was recently and
unexpectedly broken in May 2017 at the Indus Water Commission meeting in
Islamabad.' 0 4 Historically, Indus Water Commission meetings tend to be either
suspended or unproductive. India's newly adopted and far more aggressive
determination to impede upon Pakistan's water supplies has further exacerbated
water conflicts.' Consequently, it is very much feared that-owing to emerging
Pakistani problems of water scarcity, power shortage, subsiding agriculture sector,
and growing population, supplemented with threats to navigate the western rivers
6
waters-a water war is inevitable. 0
Pakistan's water supplies are already scarce, and India is further constricting
Pakistan's supplies by raising water management infrastructure over the western
7
tributaries, which are allocated to Pakistan. 0 Through all of these construction
works, it is noted in this section, India has gained the capacity to stop all of
Pakistan's water supplies for almost a month.'" This ability translates into India's
hydro-hegemony over Pakistan. India can use its dominant hydropolitical position
to influence Pakistan during conflicts and political disputes, which will
09
This
inadvertently ensure India's political supremacy in regional politics.
conclusion is already reflected in the aggressive official stance of India and its race
to develop infrastructure exclusively on western waters.110
III.

INDIA'S PERSPECTIVE

This section focuses on the Indian perspective to gain control of Pakistan's
water supplies by increasing its water management capacity."' In order to explore
true Indian perspectives, this section is divided into three subsections. Section
III(A) will explore why India is rethinking the existing bilaterally agreed treaty.
Section III(B) will give similar analyses of the Indian rationale for modifying or

103. Asian Development Outlook 2013. Asia's Energy Challenge, ASIAN DEV. BANK 208 (2013),
https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/30205/ado2O13_1.pdf.
104. Ayesha L. Sethi, India-Pakistan Hold Indus Water Commission Talks After Two Years,
CITIZEN (Mar. 21, 2017), http://www.thecitizen.in/index.php/OldNewsPage/?Id=10214&IndiaPakistan/Hold/lndus/Water/Commission/Talks/After/TwoYears.
105. See generally Masood, supra note 100.
106. Guzman, supranote 93, at 161.
107. See Ahmar, supra note 69 (demonstrating how Indian construction works are constricting
Pakistan's water supplies).
108. Chandio, supra note 94.
109. Iqbal, supra note 89, at 104-05.
110. See, e.g., Masood, supra note 100.
111. Id; see, e.g., Caballero-Anthony & Hangzo, supra note 38; see also Malayama Manorama,
supra note 62, at 573 (demonstrating how India is trying to capture Pakistan water supplies); see also
Jain et al., supra note 62, at 940 (demonstrating Indian water management capacity and its race to
develop more infrastructure).
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scrapping the IWT. Section III(C) will give insights into scholarly understandings
and schools of thoughts within India in respect of modifications to or nullification
of the IWT or establishing IWT II.
A. India Rethinking the IWT
Indian authorities are rethinking the nation's participation in the IWT and
may go so far as considering the unilateral scrapping of IWT.11 2 This is solely
motivated by India's desire to exploit the western river waters, which the existing
IWT framework stands as an impediment to. Specifically, the IWT prohibits
construction over the western rivers as these are actions which would effectuate
India's desire to establish hydro-hegemony and deny Pakistan it's legal water
rights."' Delhi's readiness to revoke the IWT and its frequent construction works
in violation of the IWT reflect India's interest to not abide by the existing
provisions of the agreement.1 14 India's plan to raise water management
infrastructure is to establish hydro-hegemony and ensure political supremacy in
relations with Pakistan."
Additionally, India's perspective reflects its belief that the IWT is too
generous to Pakistan." 6 In this regard, Indian scholar Brahma Chellaney noted
that:
[I]t might prompt India to rethink a treaty that was extremely generous
to Pakistan. There was no treaty in the world, which had been so
generous on the part of the upper riparian to the lower riparian state.
India was starving its own northern regions and reserving four-fifths of
the water for Pakistan. If Pakistan played this dangerous game, they
would make India review its generosity.'"7
While Chellaney believes that the IWT is too generous to Pakistan, this
Article aims to demonstrate that India's actual interest is not, as Chellaney argues,
to rehydrate its northern regions. Rather, it is to exploit the western rivers and gain
hydro-hegemony status over Pakistan by taking advantage of being an upper
riparian state.
B. Indian Rationalefor Modifying or Nullifying the IWT
India, as an upper riparian state, currently faces water conflicts with three
prominent nations, Pakistan, Nepal, and Bangladesh."' Each of these nations has
accused India of diverting water supplies away from their due course by
constructing infrastructures that navigate and manage the international waters.
112. lqbal, supra note 89, at 105-06.
113. BHARAT VERMA, 17(2) INDIAN DEF. REv. 9 (2002).
114. Nausheen Wasi, Harnessingthe Indus: Perspectivesfrom Pakistan, 3(11) EPILOGUE 34, 3537 (2009); see also, Guo, supra note 71, at 143.
115. Caballero-Anthony & Hangzo, supra note 38; see also Malayana Manorama, supra note 62,
at 573; see also Jain et al., supra note 92; see also Iqbal, supranote 89, at 104-O)5.
116. Kumar, supra note 27, at 265.
117. Chandio, supra note 94.
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India is thereby taking advantage of being an upper riparian state to the direct
disadvantage of these three states."'1 The state that controls the water supplies
controls regional politics,1 20 and, given the aggressive actions of India, it is clear
that India seeks hydro-hegemony to control the reins of political supremacy in the
region. In order to ensure regional hegemony, India needs to capture and exploit all
possible international waters.121 In this regard, the IWT poses a major impediment
to India's objective because exploitation of the western rivers and changes to the
flows or navigation of waters is a violation of the IWT's existing legal
framework.1 22
India argues that the IWT and its dispute resolution mechanism have long
posed impediments to India's construction works because Pakistan makes sure to
exploit all available forums under the IWT framework.1 23 Consequently,
construction work in India is frequently delayed and the delay incurs increased
economic costs. Indian scholars have routinely expressed the opinion that the IWT
inhibits India from fully enjoying its potential to produce hydroenergy, which also
harms India as an "opportunity cost."'24 India faces increasing pressure from its
states to scrap or modify the IWT. For instance, three motions were moved to
25
India's national assembly to review the IWT.1
Meanwhile, India's perspective on the Kashmir issue, a prolonged conflict
between India and Pakistan, is more about Pakistan obtaining control of the
headworks of its own water supplies than it is about liberating Kashmiris.1 26 There
is some truth to this as well, because the Kashmir occupation has a lot to do with
water sources and the headworks. Professor Asit K. Biswas, co-founder and
Editor-in-Chief of International Journal of Water Resources Development,
mirrored the proposition that the Kashmir issue mainly surfaced because of the
"struggle over rivers, rivers with their headworks in the Kashmir, flowing through
Pakistan." 27 Within the scope of the Kashmir conflict, the Indian Defense Review
of 2002 demanded that the state nullify the IWT in its entirely.1 28 This report
underscores contentions that the occupation of Kashmir is primarily concerned
with capturing the headworks of Pakistan's water supply. The report refers to
Pakistan as the enemy and states that, if India manages to control all of the water
supplies of Pakistan, the "enemy stands crippled." 29 Biswas adds that India cannot
construct infrastructure to be able to divert or manage all water supplies of
119.
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Pakistan.' 30 Therefore, India needs long-term planning to raise its infrastructure
and subsequently divert and store Pakistan's waters. It goes so far as to explicitly
state that India can employ and enjoy political supremacy and hurt Pakistan
through raising infrastructure by scrapping the IWT entirely rather than by going to
war or using violence.' 3 1
India seeks to manage the water resources of Kashmir by raising
infrastructure, because Kashmir is the major source of water supply for Pakistan,
and without these supplies Pakistan's position in the region will be crippled.1 32 In
2002, the then-president of Pakistan, Pervez Musharraf, emphasized Kashmir and
its waters' importance for Pakistan, noting that "without Kashmir waters the entire
Pakistan is likely to turn into barren desert."' Recognizing this, India seeks to
renegotiate the TWT to modify its terms so that India can further exploit the
western rivers, or, alternatively, to scrap the IWT entirely and enter into a new
treaty with Pakistan, generally identified by scholars as IWT 11.134
C. The Indus Waters Treaty II
Recent developments in Indian scholarship are tilting the focus toward
modifying or revoking the existing IWT under the guise of "benefit sharing," to
resolve the actual and cognitive Indian rationale.' 5 India's need for a new
mechanism of water apportionment only arose because the existing legal
framework does not legitimately allow India to divert or store water from the
western rivers, which are designated for the unrestricted use of Pakistan but lie
physically in Indian-occupied Kashmir. 36
This IWT II contemplation can be categorized by two competing arguments.
One side advocates for the adaptation of the existing IWT, which in other words is
a simple call for modifications to the IWT. The other side proposes an entirely new
treaty, essentially the revocation of the IWT."'
Indian scholars like Verghese tend to side with modifications to the IWT.
Verghese argues that since there is room under Article 7 of the IWT for expansion
in future cooperation, the IWT II can be established on the foundations of the
current IWT. He also advocates for benefit sharing and believes that Pakistan and
India should jointly manage and control waters, whereby Pakistan should also bear
some of the costs of this infrastructure.13 8 He adds that India is entitled to this
limited use of the western rivers under the IWT and both India and Pakistan,
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through a combined effort, can benefit equally from shared hydropower,
moderated floods waters, and a number of other benefits.1 3 9
On the other hand, proponents like Ramaswamy lyer, Former Secretary Water
Resources, Government of India, are inclined toward the revocation of the IWT
and are supportive of the IWT II as a replacement. Ramaswamy believes that since
the IWT has already provided a legal framework for water apportionment there can
140
Unlike Verghese,
be no further utilization in the modification of existing treaty.
he proposes that, instead of modifying an existing treaty, a new legal framework to
envisage water apportionment should be fashioned to curb emerging Indian
interests. 14' His contention for the IWT II is that there cannot be two parallel water
apportionment treaties, since the physical water apportionment can only follow one
water sharing legal framework.1 42 This is not because modifications are not
possible in the IWT but rather because Ramaswamy is a proponent of new
principles for water apportionment between India and Pakistan, in a holistic
fashion,1 43 to be able to exploit the western rivers more effectively.
1. Schools of Thought in the IDSA Report: Five Divisions
The Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses (IDSA) published a report on
the proposals for modifying the existing IWT, and demands installment of the IWT
II. In a manner similar to Indian scholars, the IDSA report, called Water Security
for India-The ExternalDynamics, discusses both modification and nullification of
the IWT to safeguard Indian interests.'" The report explicitly acknowledges that
existing provisions of the IWT are impediments to the construction works of India
over the western rivers. The report states that there are "some stringent provisions
in the IWT that thwart India's plans of developing projects on the western
rivers."' 45 The report adds that, in order for India to be able to walk away from its
obligations under IWT provisions, modification or revocation of the IWT is
necessary. The reasoning for modifying and abrogating the IWT are only described
as the desire to continue India's construction works over the western waters. 146
However, such reasoning reflects the same proposition of this Article, that India is
intending to capture Pakistan's water supplies through its construction works,
which are in violation of the IWT. The purpose of these construction projects is
only to establish hydro-hegemony and gain political supremacy. 14 It is apparent
that the IWT remains a major impediment between India's water exploitation

139. Id.
140. Ramaswamy R. lyer, Indus Treaty: A Different View, 40(29) ECON. & POL. WKLY. 3140,
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practices and Pakistan's water interests and water rights. 148
Moreover, the IDSA report, in a way similar to Indian scholarship, advocates
"benefit sharing." As to the possibility of modifying the IWT, the IDSA report sees
the opportunity to explore subsidization of Indian construction works' costs and
proposes to share those costs with Pakistan. 4 9 Besides helping this Article to
identify India's rationale for modifying or nullifying the TWT, this report contains
five different schools of thought with respect to general viewpoints and
motivations for modifying or revoking the IWT.5 0
2. First School

'

The first school of thought-according to the IDSA report-wants IWT II as
a modification within the existing IWT. It proposes to achieve this by employing
modifications under Articles 7 and 12 of IWT. This division believes that such
modifications would ensure the resolution of current political tensions between
India and Pakistan. Additionally, this would also enable the IWT to encompass
growing environmental concerns within the Indus basin, coupled with an emphasis
on climate change and global warming.' 5
3. Second School
The second school of thought does not believe in the proposition of
modification of the existing IWT. This is based on the logic that the IWT has a
built-in nexus with partition; thus, it cannot appease conflicts effectively.
Consequently, this division suggests that the IWT should be revoked and a new
water apportionment treaty should be installed.15 2
4. Third School
The third school of thought set forth in the IDSA report looks at the state
government of Indian-occupied Kashmir. The state of Indian-occupied Kashmir
believes that the IWT reduces the state's potential to grow."' Therefore, this state
calls for a review of the existing IWT. It argues that the IWT does not allow the
state to construct infrastructure to effectively manage or control its own waters.1 54
Consequently, it faces a severe power shortage and an underdeveloped agricultural
system. However, specific analysis of the IDSA report suggests that such an
argument in favor of abrogating the bilateral treaty is not proposed to ensure power
production in Kashmir but rather to be able to better control the water supplies of
Pakistan. "I

148. Id
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Id at 105.
IDSA, supra note 144, at 40.
Id.
Id. at 40-41.
Id. at 41.
Id.
Kokab & Nawaz, supra note 47, at 214.

2017

INDUS WATERS TREATY

63

5. Fourth School
The fourth school of thought within this report seems to most clearly set forth
India's reasoning for proposing the IWT II, which is to use water management to
ensure hydro-hegemony and enjoy political supremacy. This group prefers to term
this analysis as choosing the lesser evil: instead of using violence, water should be
used as a coercive political tool to ensure India's political supremacy over
Pakistan.'16
6. Fifth School
The fifth school of thought maintains that India has not yet fully exploited the
western waters under the allowed limits of IWT, so any demands for the
modification or revocation of the IWT and demands for IWT II are totally baseless.
This group holds that India should first exploit the western rivers to the full extent
in accordance with the IWT, and only after that can India demand more.' This
group reasons that calls for the IWT II, without first exhausting the current legal
framework, is illogical. This group adds that, in time, and after complete
exploitation of the western rivers, the IWT can be modified and brought into line
with modem international law and emerging aspects of water apportionment, such
as rules and aspects of equitable apportionment, the Helsinki Rules, environmental
58
protection rules, and climate change guidelines.'
IV.

PAKISTAN'S PERSPECTIVE

This section will comprehensively portray Pakistan's concerns over India's
construction works and the difficulties that Pakistan faces in ensuring its water
rights under the legal framework of the IWT.' 5 9 Section IV(A) will set out the
possibility of resolving water conflicts between India and Pakistan peacefully and
efficiently within the IWT's existing legal framework. Here, the trust deficit
between the two states, a primary driving force behind all water conflicts between
the countries, will be briefly discussed. Thereafter, a recommendation is set forth
in the form of a mechanism to curtail the trust deficit within the scope of the
existing IWT and defuse regional tensions while accommodating both states'
60
concerns.1
By using its status as an upper riparian state to Pakistan, India is trying to
exploit all of the western river waters and control Pakistan's water supply in a
more significant manner. Through the construction of infrastructure India hopes to
gain hydro-hegemony and assert political supremacy over Pakistan.' 6' To ensure
this hegemony, India is already planning to build over sixty dams across the
western rivers; these dams will increase its capacity of water storage facilities, to
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manage the shared waters of the western rivers more efficiently, and to exploit the
IWT to its furthest limits.1 62 Pakistan has already raised concerns about some of
India's major construction works on the western waters, for instance the Salal,
Kishanganga, Wullar, Baglihar, and Ratle,.' 63 These projects have the capacity to
completely drain the major western rivers of Pakistan, e.g., the Chenab and Jhelum
rivers. The fast pace of construction works on the western rivers reflects Indian
keenness to gain control of all of the water supplies of Pakistan.' 6 4 This proposition
is further supported by the fact that India is contemplating the construction of a
dam of considerable size in collaboration with Afghanistan. When completed, this
dam will hold 0.5 Million Acre-Foot (MAF) of water diverted from Pakistani
water supplies; this project is known as the Kama Hydropower Production
Project.' 65
In its legal actions against India, Pakistan has frequently maintained that such
construction works deprive Pakistan of its water supplies in violation of provisions
under the IWT.' 66 By the time the issue reaches the highest forum, with all kind of
political interruptions and the inefficiency of the dispute resolution mechanism
under the IWT, the issues raised are proved redundant, as the objectionable
projects have by that time either been completed or incurred so much cost that they
cannot be held back.' 7 And, even if the court does agree with Pakistan's stance,
it's legal remedies fail to affect meaningful change. This loophole exists within the
IWT's enforcement. 6 1 In many instances, when India is accused of violating the
IWT, India maintains that it can construct as many structures as it wants to, as long
as it does not divert its waters away from their natural course or use waters for
consumptive purposes.' 69
Robert G. Wirsing and Christopher Jasparro have noted that India is trying to
poach Pakistani waters. They add that the permission in the IWT of the
construction of infrastructure for non-consumptive uses is a futile task of guarding
its water resources against Indian poaching.' 70 Furthermore, Pakistan claims that
India is robbing Pakistani waters. This assertion reflects the gradual but dramatic
decrease of water flows and supplies from India over time. In response, India
claims that the decreased water flows are due to climate change, not its
construction works."' Consequently, the trust deficit between India and Pakistan
seems irreparable, since there is no transparency in essential data sharing
mechanism of water flows. In order to mend this conflict, certain measures within
162.
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the scope of the current IWT should be employed to resolve tensions between
India and Pakistan, such as installation of telemetry system.1 72
A. Resolving Conflicts under the CurrentMechanism of the IWT
The IWT is a comprehensive document and its provisions can effectively
resolve all the outstanding conflicts between India and Pakistan. For instance,
Article 6 mandates the exchange of data between India and Pakistan regarding
water flows and construction works.' 73 Similarly, Article 7 sets out a mechanism
for cooperation between Pakistan and India by mutual agreement.1 74 These
provisions and their scope are flexible, and can be expanded to cover current
disputes between India and Pakistan.
1. Trust Deficit due to Noncompliance
As a lower riparian state and as a party to the IWT, it is Pakistan's right to be
informed of the commencement of any kind of construction work by India over the
western rivers.' 71 Under the IWT, India is supposed to exchange data of planned
76
construction works at least six months before their commencement.1 Section 9 of
Annexure D of the IWT requires India to communicate relevant information to
Pakistan regarding power production projects. Annexure D, Section 9 states as
follows, regarding the exchange of data on Indian construction works:
To enable Pakistan to satisfy itself that the design of a Plant conforms to
the criteria mentioned in Paragraph 8, India shall, at least six months in
advance of the beginning of construction of river works connected with
the Plant, communicate to Pakistan, in writing, the information specified
in Appendix II to this Annexure. If any such information is not available
or is not pertinent to the design of the Plant or to conditions at the site, it
77

will be so stated.1

Section 9 of Annexure D focuses mainly on run-of-the-river power production
plants. Analogously, Section 12 of Annexure E requires India to share data six
78
months prior to the commencement of the construction of storage facilities.'
Likewise, Section 4 of Annexure E obliges India to share information with
Pakistan about storage facilities.' 79 These obligations are mainly provisioned to
ensure that Pakistan's water interests are secured, and that India's construction
works are in conformity with the provisions of IWT. Information sharing enables
Pakistan to raise timely objections to any construction works that it considers to be
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in violation of the requirements under the IWT.'10

-

Despite the information sharing mandated in Section 9 of Annexure D and
Section 4 of Annexure E, in practice, sharing data is neither clear nor simple
during the construction works and regarding the inflows and outflows of India's
projects over the western waters.'"' As a result, deferred and derisory exchanges of
data lend to the creation of water disputes.' 8 2 India has frequently failed to deliver
complete and unequivocal data in a timely fashion to Pakistan. Pakistan raised
grievances during the construction works of the Wullar, Baglihar, Dul-Hasti, Uri
II, Kishanganga, Chutak, and Nimoo Bazgo projects but India provided no data
upon Pakistan's lodging of complaints in these instances.' 8 3
The obscurity in exchanged data diminishes Pakistan's ability to evaluate or
access the compatibility of India's projects with provisioned requirements for the
construction of infrastructure under the IWT. '" A timely exchange of data is vital
to Pakistan's ability to gauge the legality of India's projects under the IWT and
raise timely objections.' Arguably, if India complies with the provisions of the
I-WT by exchanging construction works data in a timely manner, then mainstream
Pakistani concerns over India's construction works could be mitigated. 86
2. Sharing Data and Building Trust
As a lower riparian state and a party to the IWT, it is Pakistan's legal right to
receive water flow data on the western rivers from India.' Specifically, under
Article 6 of the IWT, it is the Indian obligation to exchange all such data. 8 8
Article 6 reads as follows:
1)

The following data with respect to the flow in, and utilization of
the waters of, the Rivers shall be exchanged regularly between the
-

Parties:

a)

Daily (or as observed or estimated less frequently) gauge and
discharge data relating to flow of the Rivers at all observation
sites.

b)

Daily extractions for or releases from reservoirs.

c)

Daily extractions for or release from reservoirs.

d)

Daily withdrawals at the heads of all canals operated by the
government or by a government agency (hereinafter in this
Article called canals), including link canals.

e)

Daily escapages from all canals, including link canals.

180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Iqbal, supra note 89, at 107.

183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

See Ali et al., supra note 66, at 174.
lqbal, supra note 89, at 107-08.
Id.; see also Indus Waters Treaty, supra note 60, art. 6.
Id.
Indus Waters Treaty, supra note 60, art. 6; see also lqbal, supranote 89, at 106.
Indus Waters Treaty, supra note 60, at Annex. C § 10; see also lqbal, supra note 89, at 106.

2017

INDUS WATERS TREATY
f)

67

Daily deliveries from link canals.

These data shall be transmitted monthly by each party to the
other as soon as the data for a calendar month have been
collected and tabulated, but not later than three months after the
end of the month to which they relate: Provided that such of the
data specified above as are considered by either Party to be
necessary for operational purposes shall be supplied daily or at
least frequent intervals, as may be requested. Should one Party
request the supply of any of these data by telegram, telephone, or
wireless, it shall reimburse to other Party for the cost of
transmission.
2)

If, in addition to the data specified in Paragraph (1) of the
Article, either Party requests the supply of any data relating
to the hydrology of the Rivers, or to canal or reservoir
operation connected with the Rivers, or to any provision of
this Treaty, such data shall be supplied by the other Party to
89
the extent that these are available.'

Article 6 explicitly makes it obligatory for India to exchange data with
Pakistan with regard to inflows and outflows of any relevant structure constructed
by India on the western waters.' 90 The decreased river flows, as a result of India's
projects, consist of the majority of water disputes between Pakistan and India.
Pakistan believes that India is intentionally diverting Pakistan's water supplies,
while India maintains that the decreased water flow into Pakistan is due to climate
change.'91 These differing opinions escalate into full-blown disputes because of the
prevailing opaqueness in data sharing with Pakistan,.192 The leading cause for this
trust deficit may not appear malicious on its face, as both states operate outdated
technology for gauging and sharing technical data. However, in consideration of
the prevalent accessibility of superior technology and data sharing mechanisms,
this lack of transmutation can only represent opaqueness.193
Fortunately, installing modern technology on rivers, canals, and infrastructure
can abridge this issue. For instance, the installation of a simple telemetry system
would ensure the real-time exchange of data between India and Pakistan. A
telemetry system is a water management application that reflects the real-time data
of water flows.1 94 This system is acclaimed worldwide because of its convenience;
for instance, this system can measure water "quality, quantity, sediment flow,
snow, ice melt, weather forecasting, and meteorological data, water shed
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forecasting, flood warning."' In the summer of 2010, at an Indus Water
Commission meeting, India and Pakistan agreed to install a telemetry system to
ease the exchange of data and placate water conflicts, and in doing so mitigate the
trust deficit between the nations.' 9 6 This installation will enable India and Pakistan
to record and exchange real-time data with each other at ease. Successful
installation of this system would possibly diminish the trust deficit between the
states and will enhance transparency in the water sharing system. 9 Moreover, this
system would be able to forecast floods and would be able to decrease the
subsequent devastation'" in both states. However, this system has not been
installed so far.
3. Stretching Article 7

'

India argues that a new treaty is needed in light of emerging concerns that the
existing legal framework under the IWT is ill-equipped to handle the main aspects
of contemporary water conflicts.' 99 For instance, Indian experts note that the IWT
does not cover environmental aspects of water apportionment. It does not address
regulations regarding groundwater aquifers as a transboundary resource of water.
Further, it does not address concerns specific to climate change and glacier melting
in the greater scheme of water apportionment. 20
India's contention would hold that the evolving nature of climate change and
glacier melting is not quantified in water apportionment, and therefore the
decreased water flows are not addressed under the IWT as it currently stands.20
On the other hand, owing to the trust deficit, Pakistan maintains that it is India's
water diversions, rather than natural, environmental phenomena, that have
restricted Pakistan's water supplies.202 Fortuitously, the installation of a telemetry
system can resolve these water conflicts, as discuss in the previous section. 2 03
For instance, Article 7 of the IWT provides a mechanism to placate growing
tensions within the existing legal framework of the IWT. Article 7 states as
follows:
The two Parties recognize that they have a common interest in the
optimum development of the rivers and they declare their intention to

cooperate by mutual agreement, to the fullest possible extent. In
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particular:
a)

Each Party, to the extent it considers practicable and on agreement
by the other Party to pay the costs to be incurred, will, at the
request of the other Party, set up or install such hydrologic
observation stations within the drainage basins of the Rivers, and
set up or install such meteorological observation stations relating
thereto and carry out such observations thereat, as may be
2
requested, and will supply the data so obtained. 0

This provision permits both states to install observation stations to track water
flows and other essential data. Similarly, both states may construct meteorological
observation stations, which can be used to observe and forecast floods, weather
conditions, and soil erosion, in addition to check the quantification of water
flows. 205
These observatories can be used to evaluate water flows, transmit data in a
timely manner, and resolve forthcoming disputes from either party. For instance,
the installation of these observatories would allow India and Pakistan to observe
the Himalayan glaciers and determine ice-melting quantification in water flows. In
this context, the International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development
(ICIMOD) in Nepal has already taken the lead in observing the ebbing of glaciers
and its effects on water supplies. China, India, and Pakistan, among others, have
readily consented to collaborate with ICIMOD in this scientific venture because of
20 6
A
the growing concern over the impacts of climate change in the Indus Basin.
is
Basin
Indus
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in
all
nations
among
agreement
multilateral, collaborative
the
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change
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climate
consequences
future
necessary to evaluate
207
shared water supplies.
As a lower riparian state, Pakistan is situated in a geographically fragile
position, particularly as India's construction works over the western rivers have
208
In this regard, the scope of
caused substantial environmental degradation.
Article 7 should be expanded to accommodate environmental protection. Other
international instruments, like the Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational
Uses of International Watercourses, 1997, oblige states to prepare environmental
209
Another route to
impact assessment reports for any major construction endeavor.
ensuring environmental protection would be for India and Pakistan to mutually
require the creation and maintenance of impact assessments for any project on or
near the western rivers.
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CONCLUSION

'

Upper riparian nations with military, economic, and political might tend to
enjoy hydro-hegemony in their regions when utilizing international river waters.2 1 0
India, as an upper riparian state, is trying to take control of the water supplies of
Pakistan in order to establish hydro-hegemony and enjoy political supremacy.2 1
This is evident through an examination of India's non-compliance with the Indus
Waters Treaty and its recent efforts to modify the existing framework of the IWT,
or scrap it entirely. Furthermore, India's rationale, corroborated by government
records and scholarly reports, demonstrates its desire for regional hydrohegemony. Hydro-hegemony in turn gives rise to water conflicts.2 12
Despite the presence of a water sharing treaty (the IWT), India and Pakistan
face ongoing and surmounting water disputes. These conflicts are clearly
articulated by Pakistan's concerns over India's construction works on the Western
rivers. The dispute resolution framework of the IWT is slow to process conflicts,
which defeats its purpose. This is because by the time the issue gets to the highest
available forum to seek justice the Indian construction works have typically been
completed or incurred so much cost that the forums are unable to deliver justice to
Pakistan.2 13
Over time, and through the construction of numerous, massive water storage
and management facilities, India has managed to acquire considerable storage and
managerial capability over the western tributaries. With this ability, India can
cause droughts and floods in Pakistan at whim.2 14 It is calculated that India can
stop all water supplies of Pakistan in a conflict for twenty-eight consecutive
days.2 1 5 As such, India's capacity to hold Pakistan's water supplies is tantamount
to a political maneuver to ensure Indian political supremacy in times of war or
conflict. Additionally, this translates into Indian hydro-hegemony over Pakistan, so
that India can use hydropolitics to influence Pakistan during conflicts and political
disputes, which will ensure Indian political supremacy in the regional politics as
well. 2 16
The existing legal framework of the IWT poses an impediment to the Indian
desire to establish hydro-hegemony and deny Pakistan's legal water rights. As a
result, Indian authorities are rethinking the IWT and go so far as to imagine
unilaterally scrapping of the IWT.2 17 India's need for a new mechanism for
apportioning water only arose because the existing framework does not
legitimately allow India to divert or store western river waters, which are
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designated for the unrestricted use of Pakistan but lie physically in Indian-occupied
Kashmir. 2 18

On the other side, Pakistan strongly opposes modification or revocation of the
IWT and prefers the possibility of resolving water conflicts peacefully and
efficiently within the existing legal framework provided in the IWT. 2 19 It is noted
in this Article that almost all water conflicts between India and Pakistan are due to
the opaqueness in the sharing of data on water flows.2 2 0 Pakistan claims that India
is robbing Pakistan's waters, based on the fact that water flows and supplies from
India have decreased dramatically. In response, India claims that the decreased
water flows are due to climate change. Consequently, there is a significant trust
deficit between these two states, since there is no transparency in the data sharing
mechanism regarding water flows.
A timely exchange of data is Pakistan's legal right, in order to gauge the
legality of Indian projects under the IWT, so that Pakistan can appropriately raise
objections. 221 Under the IWT, India is supposed to exchange data on planned
constructions at least six months before the commencement of any construction
works. 222 Installing modem technology on rivers, canals, and infrastructure can

resolve the trust deficit. The installation of simple telemetry system would ensure
the real-time exchange of data223 between India and Pakistan. The successful
installation of this system could diminish the trust deficit and escalate transparency
in the water sharing system, resulting in the defusing of tensions between India and
Pakistan. 2 2 4
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